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Abstract
We study students placement in Egyptian colleges under the current demand/supply
placement mechanism implemented in Egypt (ǫ-mechanism). We show that the ǫ-
mechanism is not Pareto efficient nor strategy proof and, moreover, it cannot be
improved to accommodate Pareto efficiency nor strategy proofness. The final conclu-
sion is that it is better, from an efficiency point of view, to adopt a matching algo-
rithm, like the Gale-Shapley mechanism, in students placement.
JEL classification: C78, D71.
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1 Introduction
The problem of how to place high school students to colleges/universities has always taken
the consideration of the public in Egypt. Despite the vitality of the subject there is little
academic attention on the topic of how does student placement take place in Egypt1? The
problem of matching students with schools/universities is a widely discussed topic in the
education literature which started originally in Milton Friedman (1955, 1962). The ques-
tion of how to design matching mechanisms satisfying certain criteria, like Pareto opti-
mality and strategy proofness, forms the basis for a growing academic literature. Some
prominent examples in the matching literature are the house allocation problem (Ergin
2000) and school choice model (Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez 2003). We can have one-to-
one matching like in the Marriage problem formulated by Gale and Shapley (1962) where
each male is matched to one and only one female. The model was latter generalized to
many-to-one matching like the college admission problem where a one i.e college is
matched to many i.e students. There are three closing paradigms of studying matching
students with schools/universities. The first literature is on the College admission litera-
1. To the extent of our limited knowledge there are no papers on student placement in Egypt directly related
to the Gale-Shapley algorithm.
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ture introduced by Gale and Shapley (1962) where schools are considered to have prefer-
ences over prospect students (see Roth and Sotomayor (1990) for an excellent survey).
The second paradigm is School choice literature (Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez 2003) which
has a very similar mathematical structure to college admission, but differs in schools pref-
erences where schools are assumed to have priorities and not preferences over students.
These priorities are determined by local laws which differs from one country to another.
The third literature is the Student placement model due to Balinski and Sonmez (1999)
which deals with matching between students and universities, not schools. A key differ-
ence between student placement model and school choice or college admission models is
that students are assumed to have score profiles which play a central role in the admission
process, an aspect that was not important in the school choice or college admission prob-
lems. In this paper we are seeking how high school students are assigned their places in
universities under the current matching system (based on demand and supply) imple-
mented in Egypt, by adopting a simple version of the student placement model which
includes Pareto efficiency, strategy proofness and fairness. The paper is organized as fol-
lows: Section 2 introduces Balinski and Sonmez (1999) model formally and shows its main
results. Section 3 describes the mechanism implemented in Egypt and shows the draw-
backs associated with it. Section 4 discusses the possibility of improving the current mech-
anism. Section 5 concludes the paper and summarizes its main findings.
2 Student Placement
2.1 The Model
In this section we present Balinski and Sonmez (1999) model in a formal way since it pro-
vides the cornerstone of our investigation of the process of matching high school students
to colleges (universities). First we start with basic definitions and then move to the main
concepts used. Students and Colleges are represented by two vectors S = {s1,  , sn} and
C = {c1,  , cm} respectively. Capacity of college ci is qci where q = {qc1,  , qcm} is the
capacity of all colleges. Student preferences is PS = {Ps1,  , Psn} of student si. Two new
components, that are absent from school choice model, are skill categories and student test
scores. The set of skill categories is T = {t1, , tk} and the list of student test scores f =
(f s1,  , f sn), and the score of each student at each category is f si = (ft1
si,  , ftk
si). Finally,
the function t:C→ T represents what each college requires from the set of skill categories.
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A weak preference relation of students over the set of colleges including the no college
option (c0) is denoted by RS while strong preference relation is denoted by PS2. A
matching problem is defined by the vector (PS , f , q). An allocation of college slots to stu-
dents in a way that each student is allocated in only one college slot is a matching. For-
mally, a matching is a function µ: S→ C ∪ {c0} where the inverse function
∣
∣µ−1
∣
∣ 6 qc∈C is
used to overcome the problem of student surplus i.e. the number of students exceeds the
number of college slots. Three more concepts are needed to be mentioned before stating
the main results:
a) A matching µ Pareto dominates any other matching σ if there exists no student
who prefers σ to µ and there exists at least one student who prefers µ to σ. For-
mally, σ(si)Rsiµ(si) ∀ si∈S and ∃sj ∈S such that µ(si)Psiσ (si).
b) A matching µ is fair if it assigns students with higher scores their higher prefer-
ences or choices. Formally, if c¯ Ps c implies that ft(c¯)
s¯ > ft(c¯)
s , where c¯ , c ∈C and s¯ ,
s∈S.
c) A matching µ is strategy proof if it provides students with incentives to reveal their
true preferences ordering or to play an incentive compatible strategy.
2.2 Gale-Shapley mechanism
In order to evaluate the student placement mechanism followed in Egypt (ǫ-mechanism),
we need a benchmark mechanism for economic efficiency. The benchmark in our paper
will be the Gale-Shapley mechanism. The Gale-Shapley mechanism (or Gale-Shapley
deferred acceptance algorithm) was primary introduced by Gale and Shapley (1962) in the
context of two sided matching between males and females in a marriage problem. Then it
became extensively used in college admission model where schools are matched to stu-
dents, like in Roth (1985) and Roth and Sotomayor (1990). In Abdulkadiroglu and
Sonmez (2003), the Gale-Shapley algorithm is used in school choice model which differs
slightly from college admission model3. Below, we describe the Gale-Shapley mechanism
given schools quotas and students preferences, next we give some important results that
explain why the Gale-Shapley mechanism is so popular. The student assignment under
Gale-Shapley student optimal stable mechanism works as follows:
2. The matching literature use these notations rather than the conventional % and ≻ .
3. College admission model assumes that schools have preferences over students while school choice model
assumes that schools have priorities .
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Step 1: Each student proposes to his first choice. Then each school tentatively assigns
its seats to its proposers one at time in their priority order until the quota is reached. Any
remaining proposers are rejected.
Generalizing to step k ,
Step k : Each student who was rejected in the previous step proposes to his next choice
if one remains. Each school considers the set consisting of the students it has been holding
and its new proposers, and tentatively assigns its seats to these students one at a time in
priority order. Any students in the set remaining after all seats are filled are rejected.
The algorithm terminates when no student is rejected, and each student is assigned his
final tentative assignment. The main results are summarized in the following propositions,
based on (a), (b) and (c) in section 2.1.
Proposition 1. (Balinski and Sonmez 1999) Gale-Shapley student optimal mechanism
Pareto dominates any other fair mechanism.
A placement mechanism (a rule by which a matching mechanism is selected) is said to
be Pareto efficient if it selects a Pareto efficient matching. Thus, the Gale-Shapley place-
ment mechanism is Pareto efficient. The next result is about strategy proofness.
Proposition 2. (Dubins and Freedman 1981, Roth 1982). The Gale Shapley student
optimal mechanism is strategy-proof.
Analogously, A placement mechanism is said to be strategy proof if it selects a
strategy proof matching. Thus, the Gale-Shapley placement mechanism is strategy proof.
Therefore the Gale-Shapley mechanism satisfies the two desired properties, inter alia, that
we require. The reason for choosing the Pareto optimality criterion is for welfare purpose
i.e. to maximize students’ welfare with no extra costs. The choice of strategy proofness
criterion is to avoid matching students with colleges that are less preferred by them, as
shown later, which is going to affect their job market performance later in a negative way.
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3 The ǫ-Mechanism
This section aims to describe the student placement mechanism implemented by the min-
istry of higher education in Egypt, which we call the ǫ-mechanism4. Actually, the system
implemented in Egypt is not a ’mechanism’ with the full sense of word, rather it is a
matching system based on demand of students and supply of quotas. There are funda-
mental differences between the Gale-Shapley and the ǫ-mechanism as shown in table 1.
Time line Gale-Shapley ǫ-mechanism
1 Exams Exams
2 Student scores Student scores
3 MAS announcement Student preferences
4 Student preferences MAS announcement
5 Tentative placement Certain placement
Table 1.
The matching process of the ǫ-mechanism works as follows:
a) Students submit their preferences without knowing the minimum admission scores
(MAS) for each college at each category.
b) Colleges announce their minimum admission scores based on demand of students
and supply of quota.
c) Each student who’s score is equal or above his preferred college minimum admis-
sion score guarantees a place there.
As noticed, the mechanism implemented in Egypt mainly depends on supply and demand
analysis. Chade, Lewis and Smith (2009) shows that in a simple college admission model
the classical result of demand and supply analysis is still applicable. Namely if minimum
admission scores are treated as prices then when a college rises its admission standard,
then the enrollment level falls (theorem 2 in Chade, Lewis and Smith (2009)). Note that
in step (a) students do not have priori certain information about minimum admission
scores. A direct result of that uncertainty is that students submit their preferences based
on rational expectations about prospect MAS. These expectations are based on many vari-
ables like number of students and quotas, last year minimum admission scores, exams dif-
ficulty, and so on. Student’s rational expectations plays a central role in shaping students’
strategies when submitting their preferences and hence affects the final matching result.
The next part gives a description of the ǫ-mechanism.
4. The letter ǫ is a shortcut for ‘Egypt’.
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3.1 How do Things Work
In Egypt there are only two skill categories: Arts and Science and there are two colleges
categories cA and cS. Students enrolled in arts can only proceed to cA while students
enrolled in science can proceed to cA and cS i.e. t(cA) = (tA, tS) and t(cS) = tS. As shown
in table 1, students submit their preferences before knowing the minimum admission
scores, here rises an important question: On what bases do students submit their prefer-
ences? The answer is not as simple as it looks as a big proportion of students do not
reveal their true preferences for the following two reasons. Firstly, the law prohibits stu-
dents (after official college starting) from transferring from a college with a lower min-
imum admission score to any college with a higher minimum admission score even if their
original scores were acceptable for the transferred college. Later on we will see the result
of that law on students decisions and how it leads to a non strategy proof student place-
ment. Secondly, students do not know colleges MAS which force them to submit their
preferences based on rational expectations and not stating their preferences truthfully.
Now we investigate students’ strategies of preferences submission in more details. There
are two variables that interfere in students decisions: First, the possibility of future
transfer5; second, the choice of whether to reveal or not to reveal true preferences rank-
ings. Here are the three possible cases:
a) To reveal his true preferences with no future transfer possibility : In this case, he
will rank his preferences according to his free will without sophisticated planning.
b) To reveal his true preferences with future transfer possibility: The problem that
arises here is that he does not know whether he will be accepted or not in his 1st,
2nd, ..., nth option since the minimum admission scores are not announced. So if
his preferred colleges minimum admission score were below his score, he will be
risking his transfer possibility in the future.
c) Not to reveal his true preferences: He will submit his preferences according to
rational expectations about colleges ranking. Expectations about colleges ranking
are almost common knowledge since it rarely differs substantially from one year to
another from an ordinal perspective and not from a cardinal one.
5. The transfer possibility plays an important role in students’ decisions as many of them prefer to keep a
room for changing their current college in case they do not like their current choices.
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It is now clear that the law mentioned above will provide an incentive for many students
to choose option (c) as students may regard options (a) and (b) to be too risky relative to
option (c).
3.2 Main Results
Our main results are related to Pareto efficiency and strategy proofness of the ǫ-mecha-
nism. If it does not satisfy these criteria or at least one of them, we may regard as an
inferior mechanism comparing to the Gale-Shapley mechanism. The following assumption
is essential in proving our main results.
Assumption 1. There exists a nonempty set of students σ ⊂ S who are considering future
transfer possibility such that σ> δ.
Assumption 1 is to ensure, without loss of generality, that category (c) students is not
empty, moreover it is large enough relative to S. Hence we can deduce the following
result.
Proposition 3. The ǫ-mechanism is not strategy-proof.
Proof. The proof is straightforward and follows from assumption 1 
The drawback of the ǫ-mechanism of being non strategy-proof leads to deeper effects
than it looks. It actually leads to the following effect.
The Transfer effect. If the set σ is large enough i.e. up to a certain critical value σ > δ,
then there will be a large proportion of preferences submission biased towards colleges
with expected highest minimum admission scores6. A direct result is the increase of
demand for these colleges raising minimum admission scores without a true intention from
students. Hence creating an externality effect on students of categories (a) and (b) above.
Note that the transfer effect vanishes in case σ was not large enough i.e. σ < δ; in that
case the continuum assumption7 will apply.
6. Like colleges of Medicine, Pharmacy, Engineering, and so on.
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Now we move to another question, is the ǫ-mechanism Pareto efficient? The answer is
No. The question is important from the social welfare point of view, especially when we
have already a Pareto efficient mechanism (Gale-Shapley) in comparison. To show this
simple fact, the following assumption is stated
Assumption 2. The ǫ-mechanism is fair .
Assumption 2 is justified by the structure of the ǫ-mechanism that allows students
with higher scores to get their top choices ex ante MAS announcement.
Proposition 4. The ǫ-mechanism is not Pareto efficient.
Proof. We proceed by providing a counterexample to Pareto efficiency under the ǫ-mech-
anism. Consider a market consisting of only two students in the following example where
student 1 is drawn from category (c) and student 2 is drawn from either (a) or (b). Let
S= {s1, s2}, C = {c1, c2}, q=(qc1, qc2) = (1, 1), PS= (Ps1, Ps2), f = (f
s1, f s2) be the (students,
colleges, quotas, students preferences and student scores) profiles, respectively. Let the
skill categories be limited only to one T = {t1} where c1, c2 require skill category t1 i.e.
t(c1, c2)= t1. Student 1 and 2’s preferences are as follows respectively:
s1: Rational expectations-based preferences (submitted) → c1Ps1 c2Ps1 c0
Truth-based preferences (not submitted) → c2Ps1 c1Ps1 c0
s2: Truth-based preferences (submitted) → c1Ps2 c2Ps2 c0
Now consider three possible cases according to students’ average score and based on
assumption 2.
7. The continuum assumption consider the case when individual agents have a very tiny effect to affect the
whole market (c.f. Aumann 1966)
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Case 1: f s1> f s2 leads to the following placement c1 s1 and c2 s2
Case 2: f s1= f s2 leads to tie8
Case 3: f s1< f s2 leads to the following placement c2 s1 and c1 s2
It is clear that case 1 is not Pareto efficient since as each student is matched with his
second best choice despite that each student’s best choice is attainable according to the
fairness criterion. 
Indeed the analysis can be further complicated by examining bigger number of stu-
dents with different combinations from categories (a), (b) and (c) and more counterexam-
ples will be found. Fortunately, the previous simple example was enough to prove the
point.
4 Are Improvements possible ?
After reaching the basic results in the previous section, here are few more questions: Can
we improve the ǫ-mechanism? If yes, how? And if not, can we replace it with Gale-
Shapley mechanism? These questions are crucial in the context of improving the current
educational system and we attempt to provide answers in this section. As a start our find-
ings, until now, are summarized in the following table
StrategyProofness ParetoEfficiency Fairness
Gale-Shapley Yes Yes Yes
ǫ-mechanism No No Yes
Table 2.
8. In case of ties, which are rare, additional criteria are used for selection like age or geographical location.
For example the Turkish Placement office uses student’s age as an additional criteria (see Balinski and Sonmez
(1999))
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Our goal is to seek for means to improve the ǫ-mechanism strategy-proofness or Pareto
efficiency or both. The Time line difference between Gale-Shapley mechanism and ǫ-mech-
anism, as shown in table 1, is the reversal order of steps (2) and (3). Note that in the ǫ-
mechanism students submit their preferences before the MAS announcement which creates
an environment of uncertainty while the opposite happens in the Gale-Shapley mecha-
nism. Unfortunately, we cannot solve this problem by reversing steps (2) and (3) in the ǫ-
mechanism since MAS are determined based on students’ demand expressed by their pref-
erences. Indeed, this is not the case in the Gale-Shapley mechanism as it is based on a
matching algorithm and not on demand and supply (see section 2.2). A clear issue is that
our solution have to concentrate on the elimination of rational expectations-based prefer-
ences and thus eliminating category (c) of students responsible for non strategy proofness
and Pareto inefficiency. In other words, we need to make a modification that forces stu-
dent to play an incentive compatible strategy when submitting their preferences. One solu-
tion is simply by canceling the transfer law mentioned above and hence permitting stu-
dents who met MAS to transfer from lower colleges to higher ones. This will create both
a positive and a negative effect. On one hand it will reduce both the transfer effect and
category (c) students, but on the other hand it will raise a deeper problem that rises from
the fact that we have different types of degrees qualifying for college admission like
Thanweya amma, IGCSE and American Diploma, and others.
4.1 A problem raised by the transfer effect
Consider n pools of degrees qualifying for college admission: P1, P2,.., Pn where each pool
has one type of degree students e.g. IGCSE. If the transfer law mentioned above is
removed we will have the following problem. If student s1 is from P1 and transfers from a
college with higher admission score (CiH) to a lower one (CjL), then there will be an
empty place which will be filled by sn from Pn which makes it impossible to transfer back
to a higher college.
s1:CiH ,→CjL
s1:CjL9CiH
The problem will even exist if there is only one pool of students because student place-
ment under the ǫ-mechanism is certain and not tentative like the Gale-Shapley mecha-
nism. Therefore canceling the transfer law is not a feasible solution and we deduce the fol-
lowing corollary.
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Corollary 5. The ǫ-mechanism cannot be improved to compensate for Pareto inefficiency
and non strategy proofness.
The only solution is to replace the ǫ-mechanism with a Gale-Shapley mechanism which
is already shown to be strategy-proof and Pareto efficient.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have investigated the structure of the mechanism (ǫ-mechanism) used in
Egypt to match high school students with colleges/universities. The noticed point is that
the ǫ-mechanism is based on demand and supply and not on a matching algorithm like
serial dictatorship mechanism or Gale-Shapley mechanism. The main finding is that the ǫ-
mechanism is not Pareto efficient nor strategy proof . This is a direct result of requiring
students to submit their preferences before knowing colleges’ MAS which creates a general
environment of uncertainty and forces students to make uninformed decisions. Another
problem is the transfer law that prohibits students (after official college starting) from
transferring from a college with a lower minimum admission score to any college with a
higher minimum admission score even if their original scores were acceptable for the trans-
ferred college which leads to the transfer effect mentioned above. The uncertainty in the
ǫ-mechanism combined with the transfer effect leades to the following:
1. Rational expectations-based preferences dominates Truth-based preferences.
2. Students’ preferences tends to be biased towards colleges with highest MAS.
Point 1 simply restates that the ǫ-mechainsm is not strategy proof and point 2 states that
the continous rise in MAS of some colleges in Egypt like Medical and Engeineering col-
leges may not result from real demand presure, but rather because a large proportion of
students write these colleges as their first preferences without truthfully prefering them.
Hence it is better to adopt a matching algorithm, like the Gale-Shapley mechanism, is
implemented widely in matching students with public schools in Boston area (Abdulka-
diroglu et al 2005), and also in NewYork city (Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak and Roth 2008)
and have shown to be quite successful there. However, implementing the Gale-Shapley
mechanism will require a carefull study of its degree of applicability in Egypt.
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